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“All my work is more or less about the Holocaust,” French artist 
Christian Boltanski claims.1 However, he never wanted to speak 
directly about the Holocaust. His work, he claims further, is con-
scious of the Holocaust, but it is not an art that has the Holocaust 
as a theme or tries to explain it; rather, it is articulated because the 
Holocaust has taken place. It is an art that comes after.2
In the following I will try to read a couple of Boltanski’s works 
in the light of this statement. I will not read them as an all-embrac-
ing testimony to the traumatic and to most commentators unrep-
resentable historical event to which we refer by the name of the 
Holocaust, but on the contrary focus on a certain aspect of the 
Holocaust: namely desubjectifi cation – that is, the reduction of the 
human being to naked life, to wordless, almost inhuman Musel-
mann – and show how this desubjectifi cation is transformed into 
a more general human experience in Boltanski (controversially 
Boltanski, who is half Jewish, has said: “The Holocaust is only an 
example of dying. Of common and impersonal dying.”).
In his book Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and the Ar-
chive Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben reads the Muselmann 
as emblematic of Auschwitz and the Holocaust.3 Muselmann, a 
dated German word meaning, literally, Muslim, is the Lager term 
most often found in Primo Levi’s writings4 and designates “the ir-
reversibly exhausted, worn out prisoner close to death.”5 Accord-
ing to Levi the Muselmänner “form the backbone of the camp, an 
anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of 
non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead 
within them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to 
call them living: one hesitates to call their death death, in the face 
of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to understand.”6 
Sarah Kofman also describes “the detainees, who were close to 
complete powerlessness, for all human power lay beyond them; 
who were transformed by the SS into beings without faces, with-
out “self,” anonymous, grotesquely “disguised,” reduced to the 
worst abjection.”7 The Muselmann is a result of the Nazi regime’s 
wilful and organised transformation of human personhood into 
mere thing, of its fabrication of Figuren, fi gures.8 The Muselmann 
had lost all will, consciousness, language and instinct of self-pres-
ervation. He or she is an indeterminate being, a border fi gure, in 
which it is no longer possible – or hardly possible – to distinguish 
between the non-human and the human, in which life and death 
continually intermingle, a living corpse. As also noted by Adorno: 
“The last, the poorest possession left to the individual is expropri-
ated. That in the concentration camps it was no longer an indi-
1 Interview with Steinar Gjessing, 
November 1993, in Terskel/Threshold nr. 
11 (Oslo, januar 1994), p. 43.
2 Cf. the interview with Doris von 
Drateln, “Der Clown als schlechter 
Prediger”, in Christian Boltanski. Inven-
tar (exhibition catalogue, Hamburger 
Kunsthalle, 1991), pp. 61-63. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of 
Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999).
4 Cf. Brian Cliff, “On Language and 
Violence”, in Roberta S. Kremer (ed.), 
Memory and Mastery. Primo Levi as 
Writer and Witness (Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 2001), p. 107.
5 The Drowned and the Saved (New 
York: Vintage International, 1989), p. 98.
6 Survival in Auschwitz (New York: 
Collier, 1961), p. 82.
7 Sarah Kofman, Smothered Words 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1998), p. 42.
8 The expression Muselmann was in 
common use in Auschwitz, from where 
it spread to other camps as well; in other 
camps the living dead were called “don-
keys”, “cretins”, “cripples”, “swimmers”, 
“camels”, “tired sheikhs”, Muselweiber 
(female muslims) or “trinkets”, cf. Wolf-
gang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The 
Concentration Camp (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1997), p. 329n5. 
Also cited by Agamben, op.cit., p. 44.
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vidual who died but a specimen.”9 How is it possible to bear wit-
ness to this desubjectifi cation, this transformation of the human 
subject into an object; of the human being into a non-human?
The work-series Chases High School from 1986–91 more or less 
directly evokes the Holocaust in that it relies on an image of spe-
cifi cally Jewish children. In this work Boltanski has used a photo-
graph portraying the 1931 graduating class of the Jewish Chases 
High School that he found in Ruth Beckermann’s book on Jews 
of Vienna, Die Mazzesinsel. Juden in der Wiener Leopoldstadt 
1918–1938 (Wien & München: Löcker, 1984). The smiling faces 
of the 23 students in this “ordinary” class photograph have been 
rephotographed individually and enlarged until the individual 
features of the portrayed subjects are effaced and blurred. As a 
result, their eyes are transformed into empty black sockets while 
the smiling mouths are turned into grimaces of death. The photo-
graphs, presented in tin frames either perched on double stacks 
of rusty biscuit tins or placed in different confi gurations with 
these archive- or even urn-like biscuit tins, are lighted from above 
by extendable desk lamps. The aggressive glare of the lamps 
evokes the lights used in interrogation and torture rooms. Instead 
of illuminating they are blinding and obscure the enlarged faces 
even further.
The exhibition catalogue shows the original class photograph 
with the following caption: “All we know about them is that they 
were students at the Chases High School in Vienna in 1931.”10 
The caption underlines the fact that the remaining picture has no 
correspondence with a present reality: the faces of the students 
as they appear in the photograph have disappeared. And this dis-
appearance is what is acted out in the extreme close-ups. What 
we see is not the realistic illusions of living subjectivities, as the 
traditional view of photography and of the portrait would have it, 
but empty, blinded faces, objectifi ed persons.
Given the fact that a major part, perhaps all, of the represent-
ed Jewish students lost their lives in the Holocaust, Chases High 
School can be seen as an explicit reference to the Holocaust. But 
Boltanski’s work is not just about the Holocaust through refer-
ence to the victims. It also evokes the Holocaust by means of the 
connotative effects of the photographic signifi ers. The enlarged 
images, that transform the faces into skeletal vestiges, remind us 
of the photographs of emaciated survivors of the camps which 
was published after the end of the war.
There is also another non-referential way in which Boltanski’s 
9 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialec-
tics (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 
p. 362.
10 Quoted in Ernst van Alphen, 
Caught by History: Holocaust Effects 
in Contemporary Art, Literature, and 
Theory (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), p. 98.
NET 32 2005 Text.indd   78 06-03-17   14.54.48
79expropriating the subject
work evokes the Holocaust. Chases High School and other works 
like for instance The Purim Holiday can be considered as archives, 
in that they, with no overt comment and without providing a 
narrative frame, bring together images of Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust. By doing this they remind us, as Ernst van Alphen has 
noted,11 of the lists of people who died in the camps, compiled by 
the Red Cross after the war; and thereby evoking the incompre-
hensible number of victims of the concentration camps. But the 
object of these representations remains the archive as institution, 
not the “archived” subjects themselves. What is pointed at is the 
archive itself; the archival mode as something desubjectifying. 
It is thus the desubjectifi cation itself, which is acted out, re-pre-
sented and thematised.
As van Alphen emphasizes it is important to note that the last 
two ways in which Boltanski evokes the Holocaust – that is, by 
reminding us of photographs and lists made at the time as docu-
mentation – do not rely on reference as such. Boltanski produces 
what van Alphen calls a “Holocaust-effect” by means of a reenact-
ment of principles that in a certain sense defi ne the Holocaust: 11 Cf. ibid., p. 99.
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namely a radical emptying out of subjectivity as a road leading to 
the mass destruction of a people.12 The two elements in Boltan-
ski’s work that produce this “holocaust-effect” are his consistent 
use of photographic portraits and of the archival mode – what 
I would call his consistent desubjectifi cation of the represented 
subjects.
In the work-series The Dead Swiss from 1990–91 death is univer-
salised and made common in that it doesn’t, as in Chases High 
School, allude or refer specifi cally to the Holocaust, but to human 
death in general. The “subjects” portrayed in this series are some 
three thousand dead Swiss citizens as depicted in the obituary 
announcements published in a Swiss regional newspaper. As in 
Boltanski’s other photographically based works these already 
grainy photographic portraits have been reshot and enlarged, but 
this time not blurred, stressing the normality of the represented 
– as also Boltanski has commented on the work: “Previously I 
made works concerned with dead Jews. But ‘Jew’ and ‘dead’ go 
too well together, the combination is too illuminating. By con-
trast, there is nothing more normal than the Swiss. There is really 
no reason at all why they should die; in a certain sense they are 
more frightening, because they are like us.”13 Even though the 
portrayed subjects can be recognised and identifi ed, the sheer 
number of similar portraits transforms the sense of individuality 
typically evoked by the portrait genre into one of impersonal-
ity and anonymity.14 Thus, once again, the work can be seen as 
a reenactment of a defi ning principle of the Holocaust: namely 
the transformation of subjects into objects, or desubjectifi cation. 
12 Cf. ibid.
13 Quoted by Günter Metken, 
“Memento mori and Shadow-Play”, in 
Terskel/Threshold nr. 11 (Oslo, januar 
1994), p. 21.
14 In the following I draw heavily 
upon Ernst van Alphen’s description 
and comments, op.cit., p. 106f.
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This desubjectifying transformation comes about as we view the 
work. When regarding the fi rst image we can still activate the 
traditional belief in the capacity of portraiture: the presence of 
a unique individual being is somewhat clear. As we go on from 
image to image, all similar and, ultimately, all the same, the op-
posite happens, and we sense only the lack of presence, or rather, 
a profound absence, of unique human beings. The deceased are 
reduced to one identity, to neutral repetitions of the same, cut 
off from their life stories, and the portrayed are just anonymous, 
random specimens of the human race. What we see is only a col-
lection of exchangeable objects.
In this desubjectifi cation the work undercuts the standard view 
of the portrait (as something that captures the reality and truth 
of a person’s subjectivity and thus makes the portrayed subject 
present). By representing these people as dead, it foregrounds the 
idea that the photographs have no referent; and by representing 
these human beings without identifying features, it negates the 
“presence” in the portrait of an individual. All the portraits are 
exchangeable (the Swiss keep dying, as Boltanski says): the por-
trayed subjects have become anonymous. They all evoke absence: 
not only absence of a referent outside the image, but absence of 
presence within the image as well. The portraits are dead because 
they provide neither presence nor reference. All that the pictures 
offer in their plain materiality as signifi ers are human faces. In 
this way both portraiture and photography prove unable to sup-
ply the presence of someone’s subjectivity; on the contrary, they 
turn the subjects into objects – discussing the process of being 
photographed Roland Barthes writes of a sense of inauthentic-
ity and that it was as if he were “neither subject nor object but a 
subject who feels he is becoming an object: I then experience a 
micro-version of death (of parenthesis): I am truly becoming a 
spectre.”15
Boltanski thus uses the impossibility of re-presenting a living 
subject in a photographic image or language, its transformation 
of the subject into object, as a strategy for representing the desub-
jectifi cation that is also a defi ning principle of the Holocaust. In 
other words, the general, common experience of desubjectifi ca-
tion in photographic representation is employed to speak about 
and to bear witness to the concrete biopolitical desubjectifi ca-
tion in the concentration camps. In emptying out that which was 
meant to signify the individual human being Boltanski’s work 
displays the photograph’s deceptive ability to function as an “au-
thentic” trace or souvenir of personal experience.16 Displaying 
15 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: 
Refl ections on Photography (New York: 
Hill & Wang, 1981), p. 14.
16 This could be compared to what 
the work of Samuel Beckett does in re-
lation to language, see my article “Enun-
ciation, Subjectivity, and Neutrality 
– Artistic Experience in Samuel Beckett” 
in: Nordisk estetisk tidskrift/The Nordic 
Journal of Aesthetics 29–30, (2004).
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nothing but human faces the signifi ers are empty, and the sig-
nifi ed has disappeared. The referent in Boltanski’s photographs 
is not a singular she or he, but a collective they which in an un-
heimlich way confronts the viewer with the interchangeability 
of the human subject, with his or her own interchangeability. 
A comparison could be made to the way that the personal pro-
noun, the word “I”, is an “empty” signifi er; a shifter that does not 
refer to an exterior reality but, being always available, is “fi lled” 
by whoever utters it, stressing the exchangeability and thereby 
foreclosure of the subject that tries to represent itself. How can 
I be this “I” that refers to anybody who utters it? The “I” that one 
imagines to signify oneself is the signifi er with which everyone 
“signifi es” him or herself. It is a marker of the subject only as 
long as that subject is within an enunciation – analogous with the 
photo graph’s being coterminal with its referent: as soon as the 
click of the shutter has taken place, what was photographed no 
longer exists. Giorgio Agamben has described how the appropria-
tion of language that establishes the passage from language to 
discourse implies this desubjectifi cation and expropriation of the 
speaking subject: “the psychosomatic individual must fully abol-
ish himself and desubjectify himself as a real individual to be-
come the subject of enunciation and to identify himself with the 
pure shifter ‘I,’ which is absolutely without any substantiality and 
content other than its mere reference to the event of discourse. 
[…] Appropriating the formal instruments of enunciation, he is 
introduced into a language from which, by defi nition, nothing 
will allow him to pass into discourse. And yet, in saying ‘I,’ ‘you,’ 
’this,’ ’now …,’ he is expropriated of all referential reality, letting 
himself be defi ned solely through the pure and empty relation to 
the event of discourse.”17 Like the exchangeable, desubjectifi ed 
faces of Boltanski’s photographic portraits the shifter “I” does not 
refer or correspond to a living being in an exterior reality; it does 
not effect a shifting from the nonlinguistic to the linguistic, but 
from language to discourse, from the language system to its use; 
the deictic shifter does not simply demonstrate an unnamed ob-
ject, but fi rst of all the very instance of discourse, its taking place, 
and thereby in a certain sense excludes the reality of the speaker 
– language speaks always already, we could say.
The way that representation excludes and negates what it rep-
resents or designates has been described by Maurice Blanchot 
in his essay “Literature and the Right to Death”: “Of course, my 
language does not kill anyone. And yet: when I say ‘this woman’, 
real death is announced and already present in my language; my 
17 Remnants of Auschwitz. The Wit-
ness and the Archive (New York: Zone 
Books, 1999), p. 116.
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language means that this person, who is there right now, can be 
detached from herself, removed from her existence and her pres-
ence and plunged suddenly into a nothingness of existence and 
presence. My language essentially signifi es the possibility of this 
destruction; it is, at every moment, a resolute allusion to such an 
event. My language does not kill anyone. But, if this woman were 
not really capable of dying, if she were not threatened by death at 
every moment of her life, bound and united to it by an essential 
bond, I would not be able to accomplish that ideal negation, that 
deferred assassination that is my language.”18 Language, repre-
sentation, the image appears on the background of the absence 
of the thing. When something is represented, in words or images, 
it loses its singularity in order to be communicated. In taking 
place language necessarily decomposes the thing it announces 
into a being about which one speaks and a quality and a determi-
nation that one says of it. Language sup-poses and conceals what 
it brings to appear, in the very act of bringing it to appear.19 It is 
this decomposition and negation characteristic of representation 
itself that Boltanski employs as a means to bear witness to an 
experience of desubjectifi cation, which concerns us all.
Towards a conclusion I will briefl y turn to the desubjectifi cation 
of the artist subject, Christian Boltanski. What happens to the 
subject who tries to appropriate the expropriating and desubjec-
tifying photographic language?
18 “Literature and the Right to Death”, 
in The Gaze of  Orpheus and Other 
Literary Essays (Barrytown, N.Y.: Station 
Hill Press, 1981), pp. 42–43.
19 See Agamben’s “The Thing Itself”, 
in Potentialities (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p. 33.
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Boltanski has given a long series of interviews, of which it can 
be claimed that they have become an integral part of his artistic 
practice, one of his artistic mediums, in that he not only gives 
meta-comments on his work but also questions and “fi ctionalises” 
or mythologises his own subjectivity, for instance by making his 
real historical life, his biography part of his artistic material, and 
by telling lies about his childhood and then admit these as lies 
claiming that he doesn’t remember anything from his “real” child-
hood (furthermore he has written his own biography in the third 
person and has had it printed alongside the standard biography 
in all his major monographs since 1984). Asked by Steinar Gjess-
ing what it means to him to be an artist today, and what an inter-
view about his work means to him, Boltanski answers: “Each time 
you do an interview you lose a part of yourself. You are always 
repeating the same words, but an interview is never the truth – it 
is only a discourse. It’s a kind of portrait, but not the real portrait. 
The problem for an artist like me is that the more I work the less 
I am alive. In fact I have been dead for a very long time, perhaps 
since the moment I chose to be an artist. I am no more than my 
art and that is all. [...] When you are an artist, you gradually be-
come your art. You are not real anymore. […] I am just working 
out my tomb. I like the idea that when you are an artist you are in 
fact a mirror and everybody looking at the mirror can recognize 
himself. The man who produces the art is behind the mirror – he 
is no longer alive, he is nobody, he is only the portrait of the other, 
the portrait of each person.”20
The work Ten Photographic Portraits of Christian Boltanski, 
1946–1964 from 1972, that has also been made as an artist’s book, 
shows according to the handwritten captions portraits of Chris-
tian Boltanski at different ages, but this temporal frame is pure 
fi ction: all the photographs have actually been taken by his wife, 
the artist Annette Messager, the same day in a parisian park. And 
on a closer look it is only one of them that depicts Boltanski (the 
accompanying text claims that the portrait depicts Boltanski at 
the age of 20, but actually he was 28 when it was taken), the other 
9 are randomly picked boys who happened to be in the park the 
same day, and on whom he bestows the pronoun “I”. The person 
“Christian Boltanski” could be whatever child: “This little book 
was designed to show that Christian Boltanski had only a collec-
tive reality … [that of] a child in a given society.”21 His singular 
being is dissolved and Boltanski himself becomes an example, 
exemplary, a desubjectifi ed and expropriated subject. His own 
20 Terskel/Threshold nr 11 (Oslo, 
januar 1994), p. 41.
21 Boltanski in an interview with Del-
phine Renard, “Entretien avec Christian 
Boltanski”, in Boltanski (Paris: Centre 
Georges Pompidou, 1984), p. 79.
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“identity”, his construed, represented persona – Christian Boltan-
ski – is actually a death mask.
Confronted with the impersonal desubjectifi cation in Boltanski’s 
works we become aware of ourselves as subjects; aware that we 
too are subjects to desubjectifi cation, that representation, in im-
ages or words, necessarily bereaves us of our singular individual 
being, making us common in trying to communicate us. At the 
same time it is only through the experience of this non-coinci-
dence with the representation that we sense ourselves as being 
different from what is represented and thereby as having an in-
dividual singular being. In Boltanski we become aware of that 
which has disappeared, that which is absent in the representa-
tion, which can’t be brought to language, to communication: 
namely the living human being.
I have tried to read Boltanski’s work as an answer to the ini-
tially posed question of how it is possible to bear witness to de-
subjectifi cation, to the transformation of the human subject into 
a non-human object. What the work bears witness to is desub-
jectifi cation itself, not to the Holocaust directly, but to one of its 
defi ning principles.
Through the enactment of the universally human desubjecti-
fi cation in photographic and linguistic representation, through 
this bearing witness to a general desubjectifi cation, Boltanski’s 
work indirectly bears witness for the Muselmann, the fully desub-
jectifi ed, whom according to Primo Levi is the complete witness 
of Auschwitz and the Holocaust. I think this is a way to under-
stand how all his work is more or less about the Holocaust, how 
it is an art that comes after.
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